Truth or purported justice

There are a number of issues at the heart of injustice in legal proceedings, including (but certainly not limited to) the fact that truth is not the basis for determination of purported justice, the truth is actually barred from being heard or considered in certain circumstances, the fact that a number of solicitors and barristers deliberately ignore the law, conceal facts, and lie to the courts, and the fact that the judiciary, having generally been solicitors and barristers themselves, apparently see nothing wrong in the law being ignored, facts being concealed, and lies being told.

The fact is that truth is NOT the basis for purported justice. 

I can’t believe how I stupidly believed that the law was about finding the truth and facts (which I will collectively refer to as the truth) and thereby bringing justice. It actually has very little to do with finding the truth. If the truth happens to be revealed and if the court believes that it is in the interests of justice to have it revealed, and are willing to produce a remedy in line with the truth, then, and only then, that’s acceptable – otherwise, the truth will go by the wayside, as happened to me.

A prime current example of where the adversarial system is trying to hide the truth was the more recent US Trump impeachment fiasco: the Republicans denied the right to have witnesses, tapes, emails, and other vital information presented, all so that Trump (already a purportedly repeatedly proven[1] prolific liar), can remain in power – if the Republicans were prepared to have the truth revealed, they would do what they could to have the truth and facts revealed – rather than actively taking action to conceal the truth.

The reality is there seems to be a general reckless disregard of the truth – how then can actual justice be granted or given? Truth is needed in order for real justice to prevail, yet it is rarely mentioned. Truth can be categorised as being the real state of thing, and therefore, “Justice is based on truth, on what really happened[2]”. However, in disregard for that, there is the assertion that [emphasis mine] “Legal facts are the information on which lawyers base their arguments, in order to win cases in courts of law. The evidence presented during a trial is designed to prove the facts supporting one’s argument[3]”, not on the truth.

The Head of Department of Journalism, Curtin University of Technology, Western Australia, Joseph M Fernandez, said “There are long held views that the truth is subservient to justice; and that proof rather than the truth is the justice system’s main concern. That position, however, is not unanimous. A paradox that flows from this discussion is that there are at least two, potentially conflicting, kinds of truth in a trial – substantive truth and formal legal truth. The ramifications are significant[4].

The Hon JJ Spigelman AC gave an address on 26 May 2011 on “Truth and the law”. During that address, he made the following assertions [emphasis mine, his citation omitted]: “Sir Owen Dixon expressed the view that truth seeking was the objective pursued by the courts. In one address he said: ‘For some eighteen years I played my part as counsel at the bar, that is to say I was a humble auxiliary in the courts that seek day by day in case after case to come at the truth both of the law and the facts in the faith which we are all taught that that is justice’.[5] The common law adversarial system of legal procedure is not, in terms, directed to the establishment of truth. *The adversarial system is notconcerned with truth, but with ‘procedural truth’ or ‘legal truth’, as distinct from substantive fact [and] The adversarial system seeks truth, but that search is qualified when the pursuit of truth conflicts with other values. The first position was cogently stated by Sir Frederick Pollock who said: ‘Perhaps the greatest of all the fallacies entertained by lay people about the law … is that the business of a court of justice is to discover the truth. Its realbusiness is to pronounce upon the justice of particular claims, and incidentally to test the truth of the assertions of fact made in support of the claim in law, provided that those assertions are relevant in law to the establishment of the desired conclusion; and this is by no means the same thing’. To similar effect is the comment by Viscount Simon LC that: ‘A court of law … is not engaged in ascertaining ultimate verities[6][T]he untrammelled search for truth may impinge upon other public values. It is sometimes referred to in terms of a tension between ‘truth’ and ‘justice’[7]. 


As Kenneth S Klein, Professor of Law at Californian Western School of Law said [emphasis mine, citations omitted]: “The truth-finding function of trial courts almost begs for explication. Judges, lawyers, and academics often say that trials are a search for truth. If so, then it would seem to be a different meaning of “truth” than the meaning of the word in any other context. Yet there is little legal literature directly addressing the nature of the truth in the law generally, or in courts specifically[8]”.

Also, as Ray Finkelstein J (a judge of the Federal Court of Australia) said [emphasis mine]: “The topic of this essay is the adversarial system and the truth and how the former struggles to achieve the latter. My central premise is that the adversarial system is not well adapted to arrive at the truth. … This article focuses upon the civil justice system, in particular, the role of the judge in shaping the issues to be resolved or in gathering and presenting evidence. It does not attempt to define ‘the truth’. My old philosophy textbooks which discuss theories of truth, such as the correspondence, coherence, epistemic and deflationary theories, do not help much. All that I can conclude now, as I concluded when I first encountered those theories, is that I have no idea how to define the truth. In any event, I doubt the existence of an absolute or objective truth. But, what I do not doubt is that our legal system is not geared to finding the truth, however it is defined. The question that naturally arises, then, is if no one can authoritatively define the truth, how can one argue that a legal system should bother to seek the truth? The short answer is that, even if the courts cannot realise an absolute truth, the public still expects the courts to try. Whether futile or not, the search for truth is central to the court’s legitimacy in the public’s eye[9]… An investigation of what changes are required should begin with a closer look at whether the adversarial model is up to the task of pursuing truth. … [Truth] should be the only thing left standing after the battle. …. As Denning LJ famously noted, the judge’s object ‘above all, is to find out the truth, and to do justice according to law’[10] While reforms such as case management are to be applauded, they do not directly address the issue of truth-seeking. Case management may well have indirectly improved the courts truth finding ability — for example, by limiting interlocutory trench warfare that not only wastes the court’s time but distracts from truth seeking — but direct improvement to the court’s truth-seeking function is not so obvious[11].

Further, Evan Whitton notes [emphasis mine]: “Justice David Ipp, of the West Australian Supreme Court, noted in September 1995: “The United States Supreme Court has expressed itself consistently in favour of the proposition that the discovery of the truth is the ultimate purpose of the legal system. In Tehan v Scott [1966], the court affirmed that ‘the basic purpose of a trial is the determination of the truth‘. “But if trials are really trying to determine the truth they would not have magic tricks which conceal it[12]. … Justice Ipp says that according to Applegate (Witness Preparation, 1989), it is now generally accepted in the United States that “ascertaining the truth is the paramount goal of the adversarial system and the primary basis for its legitimacy“. But Justice Callinan says the paramount goal of the adversary system is not truth but winning; it appears to follow that the adversary system is not legitimate[13].”

[W]hat is the meaning of “truth” in American trial courts, and why one should care. As big as this inquiry sounds, it is tied up in equally large subsidiary questions – the meaning in courts of justification, of knowledge, and of belief, which in turn implicate the meaning in courts of fairness, of due process, and of “fact.” And only upon answering these questions can one explore the foundation of the legitimacy of the courts, and how both the meaning of truth in courts – and the public perception of the role of truth in courts – relate to the legitimacy of the courts. No small task, this. … Simply put, knowledge requires truthjustification, and belief[14].

Even when it comes to giving false testimony, or committing perjury, it is not about the truth. The court often protects those who commit what is otherwise a criminal offence [emphasis mine]: “It’s sort of the way our legal – you know, it’s a good system we’ve got and part of the system we’ve got is that people come along and give evidence and, in order to ensure that they give truthful evidence – sometimes they don’t – but in order to ensure that he do, our system says nobody can be sued for the evidence that he or she gave. … You’d go to gaol, but they can’t be sued for it[15]”. If such liars were able to be sued, then they might just decide that they should tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth that they swore or affirmed they would. But no, we must hide the truth and protect those who actively and deliberately lie – and as for going to jail, that is often rubbish also (I had proved that the two men against me lied under oath and they were not even chastised for doing so – which emboldened them even further).

So there we have it in black and white from a number of reputable and recognised sources, and there are many more such confirmations that truth is, in fact, sadly, a casualty of the legal war where others seek to hide or mask the truth and where the courts refuse to allow it in it fullness, or are happy to have the fullness of truth hidden.

My previous, and obviously erroneous, belief (and the belief I had when taking action and having action against me) was that the truth had paramount footing in law. I had, apparently mistakenly, believed that the following supported that “fact” [emphasis mine]:

  • The Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) (“CPA”) specifically states, inter alia, that: “17 Overarching obligation to act honestly – A person to whom the overarching obligations apply must act honestly at all times in relation to a civil proceeding”, and “21 Overarching obligation not to mislead or deceive – A person to whom the overarching obligations apply must not, in respect of a civil proceeding, engage in conduct which is— (a) misleading or deceptive; or (b) likely to mislead or deceive”.
  • The CPA also specifically states, inter alia, that: “41 Overarching obligations certification by parties on commencement of civil proceeding: (1) Each party must personally certify that the party has read and understood the overarching obligations and the paramount duty” – this includes sections 17 and 21 quoted above. 
  • The CPA additionally specifically states, inter alia, that: “42 Proper Basis certification: (1) A legal practitioner acting for or on behalf of a party to the proceeding must file a proper basis certification which complies with this section. … (3) For the purposes of this section, a determination by a legal practitioner—(a) as to whether any allegation or denial of fact has a proper basis, on the factual and legal material available, must be based on a reasonable belief as to the truth or untruth of the allegation or denial; or (b) as to the proper basis of any non-admission is that the legal practitioner does not know, and therefore cannot say, whether a fact alleged or denial is true or untrue; or (c) as to whether any claim, response to a claim, question posed or response to a question posed has a proper basis, on the factual and legal material available, must be based on a reasonable belief that the claim, response to a claim, question or response to a question has a proper basis”.
  • Persons giving sworn or affirmed testimony must “tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth” – and they swear or affirm that they will do so;
  • The Criminal Procedure Act 2009 declares that lying under oath is a criminal offence that is subject to a prison term: “415 Court may direct that a person be prosecuted for perjury: (1) A court may direct that a person be tried for perjury if it appears to the court that the person has committed perjury in— (a) any evidence given orally before the court; or (b) an affidavit, deposition, examination or other proceeding made or taken before the court”.
  • The dictionary[16] states: “perjury: the telling of a lie after having taken an oath to tell the truth, usually in a court of law; a lie told in a court of law by somebody who has taken an oath to tell the truth; to tell a lie in a court of law and therefore be guilty of perjury; guilty of telling a lie in a court of law and therefore of committing perjury; containing lies and therefore breaking an oath to tell the truth in a court of law.
  • Judges and barristers have noted that to lie under oath is a criminal offence:
    • Perjury was defined by Justice Pagone when he said in 2013 [emphasis mine]: “And what else is lying if not an intention to lie?[17]… Mr Southall’s going to say to me the natural ordinary, and he will probably add the only conceivable meaning of the words “they committed perjury” is that they knowingly and intentionally, consciously knowing what the truth was, said something that was not truthful.[18] … And that’s a criminal offence. If truth had been in issue in the case before me it would be relevant to ask whether [man X] did give false testimony.[19] … To permit that defence to be raised is the one example (of many like examples) to which I have referred, would necessitate an inquiry into the truthfulness of statements made in proceedings in VCAT. It would involve deciding a very serious allegation, namely whether [man X] committed perjury in VCAT.[20] … Thus, his Honour identified that anyone would know that to lie would be deliberate and to do so under oath was perjury and a criminal offence.
    • Southall QC confirmed in open court, his personal knowledge that perjury was a crime [emphasis mine]: “You’re not suggesting that giving false evidence on oath is a little crime, are you?[21]… So you were emphasising “proving” that he had committed the criminal offence of perjury at the tribunal[22] … So you imported from one that it proved that he had committed the criminal offence of perjury at the tribunal?[23] … [P]erjured evidence being given at the tribunal is a serious matter. Yes, we agree it would be a criminal offence[24]. … Your Honours have no doubt picked up, in paragraph 14, that there are alternatives, particularly in criminal law; indeed, they arise under criminal – they can be applied in civil law as too – but the alternative offence of perjury, contempt and perverting the course of justice are always available to be invoked in the appropriate circumstances, such as in this case, if it were proven, if the dishonest factual evidence were proven[25]” Yet Southall allowed, and in my opinion, actually suborned perjury.
    • Kyrou JA [emphasis mine] said: “It’s hard to be accidentally dishonest[26]. … You’d go to gaol for that, you see … Sometimes the law provides criminal remedies, sometimes it provides civil remedies, sometimes it provides both[27]
    • Kyrou, Santamaria JJA and Elliott AJA provided in their Reasons [emphasis mine, citations omitted]: “98 Section 17 of the CPA provides that ‘[a] person to whom the overarching obligations apply must act honestly at all times in relation to a civil proceeding’. Section 21 provides that ‘[a] person to whom the overarching obligations apply must not, in respect of a civil proceeding, engage in conduct which is … misleading or deceptive … or … likely to mislead or deceive’. 99 The only time that a person is a witness in a civil proceeding is when he or she swears or affirms an affidavit or gives oral evidence. At those times, the witness has a legal obligation to tell the truth, otherwise he or she may be guilty of an offence. A person who swears or affirms a false affidavit of a kind referred to in s 141 of the Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958 may commit the offence of perjury. A person giving oral evidence who fails to comply with his or her oath or affirmation that the evidence he or she shall give ‘will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth’ may also commit the offence of perjury. 100 The duty of a witness to tell the truth potentially overlaps with the overarching obligations to act honestly and not to engage in misleading or deceptive conduct….” Yet they did nothing about the deceiving, misleading and false testimony that was revealed to them.
  • The Victorian Parliament Law Reform Committee’s Administration of Justice Offences – Final Report states [emphasis mine]: “The other major administration of justice offence considered was perjury[28] … Perjury [– it is] an offence to make a false statement under oath or affirmation[29] … ‘For the offence of perjury, Victorian law has extended the application of common law perjury but has not replaced it. Section 314 of the Crimes Act creates a statutory offence of perjury but it does not define the elements of offence and the common law elements of perjury apply by default. …  The mental element currently applicable for perjury provides that it is sufficient that the defendant had a lack of belief in the truth of the relevant statement’. This quotation, taken from the High Court decision of R v Rogerson, explains the terms “justice” and “course of justice” in the context of the offence of perverting the course of justice[30]. … The following quotation, taken from a recent decision of the Victorian Court of Appeal, illustrates this point: ‘It is apparent that the integrity of the operation of the system of courts upon which, it must be remembered, our community depends for the proper determination of matters of fact in both civil and criminal proceedings, may be seriously compromised and the achievement of the ends of justice thwarted by the deliberate making of false statements on oath. It is not always easy or even possible to establish that perjury has been committed. Sometimes, unfortunately, the lie may not be exposed and the injustice which has been occasioned remains unrectified. Not only can this have a serious effect upon those with a direct interest in the outcome of the particular matter, but it may also engender a reduction of confidence in the community in the reliability of court decisions generally. For these and a number of other good reasons, the crime of perjury, particularly when committed in a curial [court] setting, is regarded very seriously indeed[31]. … These are perjury and all related offences such as giving false testimony [32] and attempting to pervert the course of justice[33] … The classic common law definition of perjury is derived from the following passage in King CJ’s judgement in R v Traino:[34] … The crime of perjury consists in giving upon oath, in a judicial proceeding, before a competent tribunal, evidence which was material to some question in the proceeding and was false to the knowledge of the deponent, or was not believed by him to be true: WO Russell, Crime: a Treatise (12th ed, 1964), Vol 1, p. 291. The crime consists in the making of a deliberately false statement in the postulated circumstances.[35] [36] … Victorian statutory law has extended the application of common law perjury but has not replaced it. In contrast to the legislation in some other jurisdictions, which we will discuss below, the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) does not define perjury, leaving this to be ascertained from the common law.[37] … [T]he same section extends the application of perjury, which at common law applies to statements made in judicial proceedings,[38] to oaths, affirmations, declarations or affidavits required or authorised by any Act and section 141 of the Evidence Act 1958 (Vic) is of similar effect.[39] [40] … [I]n Victoria perjury has a wider application. The common law position has been extended so that perjury applies to the making of a false oath, affirmation, declaration or affidavit required or authorised under any statute.[41] [42] … It should be noted that perjury is also a crime against the administration of justice. It exists to punish false statements made under oath in an adversary system of litigation that depends on litigants giving truthful accounts[43] [44] … It is clear … that the common law, which applies in Victoria and the ACT, requires that on a charge of perjury there are at least two witnesses to disprove a material statement sworn by the accused or independent (documentary) evidence to corroborate the falsity of the statement.[45]
  • The Crimes Act 1958 also declares that lying under oath is a criminal offence: “314 Perjury: (1) Whosoever commits wilful and corrupt perjury or subornation of perjury shall be liable to level 4 imprisonment (15 years maximum). (2) Where in any Act it is provided that any person shall be liable to the penalties of perjury or shall be guilty of perjury or shall be deemed to have committed perjury or any similar expression is used such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence against subsection (1) and may be proceeded against tried and punished accordingly. (3) Where by or under any Act it is required or authorized that facts matters or things be verified or otherwise assured or ascertained by or upon the oath affirmation declaration or affidavit of some or any person, any person who in any such case takes or makes any oath affirmation or declaration so required or authorized and who knowingly wilfully and corruptly upon such oath affirmation or declaration deposes swears to or makes any false statement as to any such fact matter or thing, and any person who knowingly wilfully and corruptly upon oath deposes to the truth of any statement for so verifying assuring or ascertaining any such fact matter or thing or purporting so to do, or who knowingly wilfully and corruptly takes makes signs or subscribes any such affirmation declaration or affidavit as to any such fact matter or thing, such statement affirmation declaration or affidavit being untrue wholly or in part, or who knowingly wilfully and corruptly omits from any such affirmation declaration or affidavit made or sworn under the provisions of any law any matter which by the provisions of such law is required to be stated in such affirmation declaration or affidavit, shall be deemed guilty of wilful and corrupt perjury. Nothing herein contained shall affect any case amounting to perjury at the common law or the case of any offence in respect of which other provision is made by any Act”, and 
”315 All evidence material with respect to perjury – All evidence and proof whatsoever, whether given or made orally or by or in any affidavit examination declaration or deposition, shall be deemed and taken to be material with respect to the liability of any person to be proceeded against and punished for perjury or subornation of perjury” – i.e. perpetrators are subject to a prison term of up to 15 years – see also my webpage “Perjury, suborning of perjury and immunities” (also under the tab of “The problem with our injustice system”).
  • The law otherwise governing solicitors and barristers, including by the Rules demands that the truth be told – laws such as (but certainly not limited to): The Legal Profession Uniform Law Solicitors Rules; the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014; and the Legal Profession Uniform Conduct (Barristers) Rules 2015– see also my page on “Some of the relevant legislation” (also under the tab of “The problem with our injustice system”).

The truth is actually barred in certain circumstances

The object of the Defamation Act 2005 (Vic) is [emphasis mine]: “3 Objects of Act – The objects of this Act are— … (b) to ensure that the law of defamation does not place unreasonable limits on freedom of expression and, in particular, on the publication and discussion of matters of public interest and importance”. The Act goes on to say ([emphasis mine] “s24 Scope of defences under general law and other law not limited: (1) A defence under this Division is additional to any other defence or exclusion of liability available to the defendant apart from this Act (including under the general law) and does not of itself vitiate, limit or abrogate any other defence or exclusion of liability. (2) If a defence under this Division to the publication of defamatory matter may be defeated by proof that the publication was actuated by malice, the general law applies in defamation proceedings in which the defence is raised to determine whether a particular publication of matter was actuated by malice”). So there we have it, according to law, truth is not barred from being revealed because truth as a defence is additional, and the object is to ensure that freedoms of speech are protected. 

The Defamation Act provides a number of defences, fraudulent misrepresentations example, ss. 25, 26, 30, 31 and 33 [emphasis mine]: “25 Defence of justification -
It is a defence to the publication of defamatory matter if the defendant proves that the defamatory imputations carried by the matter of which the plaintiff complains are substantially true[46].  26 Defence of contextual truth – It is a defence to the publication of defamatory matter if the defendant proves that— (a) the matter carried, in addition to the defamatory imputations of which the plaintiff complains, one or more other imputations (contextual imputations) that are substantially true; and (b) the defamatory imputations do not further harm the reputation of the plaintiff because of the substantial truth of the contextual imputations. … 30 Defence of qualified privilege for provision of certain information: (1) There is a defence of qualified privilege for the publication of defamatory matter to a person (the recipient) if the defendant proves that— (a) the recipient has an interest or apparent interest in having information on some subject; and (b) the matter is published to the recipient in the course of giving to the recipient information on that subject; and (c)  the conduct of the defendant in publishing that matter is reasonable in the circumstances. (2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a recipient has an apparent interest in having information on some subject if, and only if, at the time of the publication in question, the defendant believes on reasonable grounds that the recipient has that interest. (3) In determining for the purposes of subsection (1) whether the conduct of the defendant in publishing matter about a person is reasonable in the circumstances, a court may take into account— (a) the extent to which the matter published is of public interest; and (b) the extent to which the matter published relates to the performance of the public functions or activities of the person; and (c) the seriousness of any defamatory imputation carried by the matter published; and (d) the extent to which the matter published distinguishes between suspicions, allegations and proven facts; and (e) whether it was in the public interest in the circumstances for the matter published to be published expeditiously; and (f) the nature of the business environment in which the defendant operates; and (g) the sources of the information in the matter published and the integrity of those sources; and (h) whether the matter published contained the substance of the person’s side of the story and, if not, whether a reasonable attempt was made by the defendant to obtain and publish a response from the person; and (i) any other steps taken to verify the information in the matter published; and (j) any other circumstances that the court considers relevant. (4) For the avoidance of doubt, a defence of qualified privilege under subsection (1) is defeated if the plaintiff proves that the publication of the defamatory matter was actuated by malice31 Defences of honest opinion: (1) It is a defence to the publication of defamatory matter if the defendant proves that— (a) the matter was an expression of opinion of the defendant rather than a statement of fact; and (b) the opinion related to a matter of public interest; and (c) the opinion is based on proper material. (2) It is a defence to the publication of defamatory matter if the defendant proves that— … (b) the opinion related to a matter of public interest; and (c) the opinion is based on proper material. … (4) A defence established under this section is defeated if, and only if, the plaintiff proves that— (a) in the case of a defence under subsection (1)—the opinion was not honestly held by the defendant at the time the defamatory matter was published; or … (c) in the case of a defence under subsection (3)—the defendant had reasonable grounds to believe that the opinion was not honestly held by the commentator at the time the defamatory matter was published. (5) For the purposes of this section, an opinion is based on proper material if it is based on material that— (a) is substantially true; or (b) was published on an occasion of absolute or qualified privilege (whether under this Act or at general law)… (6) An opinion does not cease to be based on proper material only because some of the material on which it is based is not proper material if the opinion might reasonably be based on such of the material as is proper material 33 Defence of triviality: 
It is a defence to the publication of defamatory matter if the defendant proves that the circumstances of publication were such that the plaintiff was unlikely to sustain any harm”.

It must be noted that, even if truth and justification have been used as a defence, the court can overturn it and say that the defence can’t be used – which I find utterly unbelievable, and if you don’t use it as a defence, you are absolutely lost. How can it be that truth can’t be used regardless . . . in a court of law??? Having said that, I guess that the first section and next sections on this page explains it – it is not about the truth but is about whatever works best for the loudest and most forceful side.

[Any reference to CASACIR or its directors, shareholders, owners or operators relates to pre-14 February 2024 when the company was sold. In no way can anything said relate to the company or its new owners, operators, directors, and shareholders after that sale.]

In 2011, man X and man Y, together with their legal team, took action against me for defamation (and for injurious falsehood and misleading and deceptive conduct. They included CASACIR in those additional claims – all claims which they later overtly withdrew[47] (after they had succeeded in bullying and intimidating me into removing my entire former website from the internet) – none of those claims had validity and they knew that (which is further reason why those claims could not proceed to court)).

My former legal team, who were in my opinion grossly inept, refused to allow me any of the defences, even though I could prove the truth of the things I wrote (and man X and man Y later even admitted under oath to the truth of a number of the items I wrote that they complained were defamatory, in spite of the fact that I was not allowed to plead truth and justification).

The closest thing to the truth I was allowed was a Notice I served on man X and man Y under r. 40.10 of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015 (Vic): “40.10 Defamation – A defendant in a proceeding for libel or slander who has not by the defendant’s defence alleged the truth of the statement complained of shall not, except by leave of the Court at the trial, give evidence in chief at the trial with respect to— (a) mitigation of damages; (b) the circumstances of publication; or (c) the character of the plaintiff— unless the defendant gives particulars of the evidence to the plaintiff by notice served not less than seven days before the trial”.

I have already addressed how the courts do not really care about discovering the truth of a matter. A profound example is in defamation cases where you are actually forbidden from revealing the truth of the verbal or written publications – unless you have specifically used truth and justification as a defence. It is simply extraordinary that the truth cannot otherwise come out. The judiciary are not interested in hearing the truth in those circumstances, and therefore cannot make a valid, fair or just ruling in such cases. A number of judges sat on my case and were very clear that the actual truth was not to be heard – they said the issue was: did I write what man X and man Y said I wrote, and would an ordinary person be likely to think less of them after reading what I wrote. The judges made the following comments [emphasis mine]:

Pagone J: But the truth of the statement is not part of the proceeding before me. … In other words, it’s not the truth of the issue that I’m concerned about, I’m just concerned about whether the natural meaning of the words alleged that somebody has done something wrong. … you can ask questions and have asked questions to show that you were concerned to protect your property and amenity in the area and that’s where all these robust remarks were being made. That I can understand and I’ve allowed you to ask questions about that. I just don’t see how going beyond that and asking questions about the accuracy of the statements really help or bear upon the questions that I have to look at[48]

Pagone J: [W]hen you read those words, the natural meaning of those words are, this man gave false testimony. And that’s a criminal offence. If truth had been in issue in the case before me it would be relevant to ask whether he did give false testimony, but truth is not in issue before me so I should assume that that was said and I would have to stop you asking questions to show the truth of what appeared. You could ask questions about circumstances, about context for aggravated damages, perhaps, but not about truth[49]

Pagone J: [T]he issue isn’t what he did, the issue is what do these words convey by their ordinary and natural meaning. … I have to look at these words and I have to work out in my own mind how a person reading those words would understand them. You may say to me when I read those words I should draw some inferences from them that’s different but what [man X] might think about what those words mean is as irrelevant as what anybody else might think about them in fact. I’ve got to look at these words and ask myself what do the ordinary – what’s the ordinary and natural meaning that the words convey when I look at them.[50]

Pagone J: Anyhow I understand how you construe pleadings as such and they don’t seem to be relevant to your remaining paragraphs. I started partly looking at that because of what [she] said about the truth being pleaded as a defence. I don’t see that pleaded. I assume that truth needs to be pleaded if it’s to be relied upon in defamation cases[51].

Pagone J: I will ask Mr Southall at some point to make sure that what I am saying about 40.10 is not wrong. He has a duty to his client but he also has a duty to the court so if what I’ve said about 40.10 to you is wrong, even though it suits his client, he has a duty to tell me that I’m wrong about it but as I read 40.10 it doesn’t permit you to run truth, it just permits you to run matters about mitigation of damages, about the circumstances of the publication and about the character of [man X and man Y]. It doesn’t enliven truth. … At the moment, as I perceive it, truth is not part of this case and you might need to think over lunch about what you should or should not or can and can’t do[52].

Pagone J: Indeed, and that’s what that’s about. … That’s about preserving a case without going to truth that enabled damages[53].

Pagone J: I can make sure she understands, as I think she does understand, she’s not able to argue the truth of the statements. The best she can do is to rely upon those three subject matters insofar as they bear upon damages[54].

Pagone J: The first potential problem is that it may not be relevant, that is to say, if the claim against you is that certain words appearing in the website had an ordinary and natural meaning which was defamatory, then a lot of what you are asking [man X] about won’t have any bearing upon the matter one way or another[55]

Pagone J: [A]s you know, truth can be set up in defence, all things being equal, putting to one side whether the lawyers debate about whether truth is a defence or simply goes to show there was no defamation.[56].

Pagone J: [T]he issue isn’t what he did, the issue is what do these words convey by their ordinary and natural meaning. …  I have to look at these words and I have to work out in my own mind how a person reading those words would understand them. You may say to me when I read those words I should draw some inferences from them that’s different but what [man X] might think about what those words mean is as irrelevant as what anybody else might think about them in fact. I’ve got to look at these words and ask myself what do the ordinary – what’s the ordinary and natural meaning that the words convey when I look at them. …[57].

McDonald J: And you were told by Pagone J you can’t pursue that line of questioning because you have not put in issue truth in your defence[58]

Kyrou JA: [C]an I interrupt you? Do you understand that, in order for something to be defamatory, it has to be false? So, a finding that something is defamatory includes within it a finding that it’s false. Do you understand that principle? … [Y]ou see, because a finding that the relevant parts of the website were defamatory, which Justice Pagone found and which the Court of Appeal upheld, means that both Justice Pagone and on appeal the Court of Appeal confirmed, if you like, that the statements that were found to be defamatory were false; that is a finding of the court. … What I’m saying to you though is that, a finding that those parts were defamatory incorporates within it a finding that it was false because, if something is true, it can’t be defamatory, that’s why there’s a defence of truth. If you want to say that what I’ve said in the website is true and therefore not defamatory, you’ve got to raise the defence of truth. … It is now impossible for you to use the legal system to establish that the statements that were found to be defamatory were in fact true. We can’t let you do that, because the only way that can be done is by pleading truth and then, if there’s an adverse finding, to appeal the truth. None of that happened.[59].

Man X and man Y had been unable to provide proof that they had suffered any losses, or been ridiculed, or had been thought less of, or had felt humiliated, or been impacted in any way (other than through self-serving unsubstantiated claims and hearsay). In fact, their claims that they had been thought less of was proved to be a lie in that every one of their witnesses said that they did not think any less of them, and this was even noted by Pagone J in his Reasons: “The evidence of those who came to hear and know of the [purportedly] defamatory words on the website seem largely to have regarded them as untrue and of little impact[60]”, and by Tate JA who said [emphasis mine]: “I don’t think I went that far, Mr Southwell [sic]. I think I said it may be similar in that some of the witnesses who accessed the website, although they read the defamatory material [in a different case], did not accept the truth of it, and I think that’s similar to some of the evidence here[61]”.

Not only had man X and man Y not been able to prove I had acted with any malice in writing my former website (because there was none), they authorised and approved of their barrister assuring the court that there was no malice: “We have never pleaded that there was malice[62]”.

By barring the truth from being heard, it allowed man X and man Y to further actively deceive and mislead the courts by further lies and gross deceptions. In some of their appeal documents, man X and man Y fraudulently claimed: “[The] baselessness of the allegations [and] the falsity of the publications[63] … [The] falsity of the allegations[64] … [The] falsity of the publications[65] … [The] remarks were entirely false and had no foundation[66] … [The] baselessness of the allegations[67] … Not only are they grave allegations, they were false[68] … [When] I opened the case, I said [the publications] were false.[69] However, this was in direct opposition to Southall having previously assured his Honour as absolute fact that [emphasis mine]: “Your Honour will note from the pleadings that we didn’t plead innuendo, either true or false innuendo, and we didn’t plead any subtle or specious or intellectual basis upon which the words would be considered …”[70], and they did this in spite of the fact that the truth had not been heard.

As a result of the above, together with the lies told by the other side, the truth was hidden in spite of me trying to reveal it, and justice was not accomplished – it was found that I had defamed man X and man Y when all I had done was reveal the truth. If they take me on for saying this, I would fight on a defence of truth and justification, amongst others – with a totally different result this time!

Many solicitors and barristers frequently deliberately ignore the law, conceal facts, and lie to the courts

Evan Whitton notes [emphasis mine]: “[I]f trials are really trying to determine the truth they would not have magic tricks which conceal it[71]. … Lord Eldon proclaimed: “Truth is best discovered by powerful statements on both sides of the question.” Members of the cartel frequently repeat this claim, but Justice Ipp says: “Lord Eldon’s aphorism is not necessarily accurate.” Indeed, it is doubly false: the law is not trying to find the truth, and lawyers are not equally powerful. The truth will not be found if the lawyer effectively trying to conceal it has the more powerful voice in thuggish cross-examination or in casuistical submission[72].

An investigation of what changes are required should begin with a closer look at whether the adversarial model is up to the task of pursuing truth. The theory of how the adversarial model is structured to attain the truth is probably familiar to everyone. The parties are supposed to engage in fierce combat, pulling apart each other’s case and, once the dust has settled, the truth will emerge. It should be the only thing left standing after the battle. The model assumes that the parties’ self-interest will ensure that all relevant material is presented and tested before the court. However, the judge must make do with the evidence thus presented and hope that the parties know what they are doing. As Denning LJ famously noted, the judge’s object ‘above all, is to find out the truth, and to do justice according to law’[73]. … In reality, however, there is an inherent contradiction between the stated aim of truth-seeking on the one hand and the passivity of the judge’s role on the other. Further, there are strong arguments against a model which relies on parties’ self- interest to discover the truth. … In practice, it is commonly accepted by lawyers that the adversarial model is primarily designed to resolve disputes, rather than discover truth. … The purpose of shaping and refining these narratives is to win the case for the client, not to find the truthPerhaps the truth is not forgotten, but it can be easily neglected. … However, during my career as a judge, there have often been times when I have felt frustrated by the limitations of my role. In many cases the evidence is incomplete. … While reforms such as case management are to be applauded, they do not directly address the issue of truth-seeking. Case management may well have indirectly improved the courts truth finding ability — for example, by limiting interlocutory trench warfare that not only wastes the court’s time but distracts from truth seeking — but direct improvement to the court’s truth-seeking function is not so obvious[74].

Lord Eldon proclaimed: ‘Truth is best discovered by powerful statements on both sides of the question.” Members of the cartel frequently repeat this claim, but Justice Ipp says: “Lord Eldon’s aphorism is not necessarily accurate’. Indeed, it is doubly false: the law is not trying to find the truth, and lawyers are not equally powerful. The truth will not be found if the lawyer effectively trying to conceal it has the more powerful voice in thuggish cross-examination or in casuistical submission[75].

A judge may intervene in the interests of justice where a party is self-represented or has an incompetent lawyer. … The primary role of counsel is to elicit evidence which helps their client’s case. Their role is only to elicit the truth to the extent that the truth favours their client. Wigmore’s famous boast that cross-examination is ‘the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth’ is not borne out in modern court practice[76]”.

I am not the first person to suggest that aspects of legal professional privilege are bringing the law into disrepute by frustrating the court’s search for truth. Nor am I the first to propose that, in some circumstances, the public interest in seeking out the truth should prevail[77]”.

It is my sincere hope that we can look beyond our historical ties to the adversarial system and affirm something that should be self-evident: that the truth should never be a plaything of the parties[78]

When one considers the role of the adversarial lawyer, one starts with what surely must be one of the more perverse aspects of the adversarial system — it is quite acceptable for parties to present their cases on a selective and potentially misleading basis. A party is not required to act candidly. Subject to discovery obligations, a party is under no duty to reveal the existence of evidence which is unfavourable and nor is that party’s lawyer. The obligations of a lawyer to the court are essentially negative in nature — to not knowingly mislead the court and to not assist their clients in breaking the law. Many commentators have expressed disquiet about the apparent willingness of the lawyer to pursue her or his client’s case with excessive zeal, subject to poorly understood and vague duties to the court, which not uncommonly are observed in the breach rather than in the practice. The shortcomings of this approach are nicely illustrated by a story told by Samuel Williston, a well-known American legal scholar. Williston recalled a case in his time at the bar where the court was delivering judgment. He recounted: ‘In the course of his remarks the Chief Justice stated, as one reason for his decision, a supposed fact which I knew to be unfounded. I had in front of me a letter that showed his error. Though I have no doubt of the propriety of my behaviour in keeping silent, I was somewhat uncomfortable at the time.’[79] Clearly this state of affairs is unacceptable. As Jeremy Bentham said, ‘if falsehood is not favoured by the law, why should concealment?’[80] A lawyer should be under a positive duty to assist the court to find the truth. … The precise nature of such a positive duty needs to be carefully defined. In essence, what I have in mind is that a lawyer must disclose to the court the existence of material evidence (particularly if it is prejudicial to the client), to correct any misapprehensions that may arise from witnesses’ testimony and to question witnesses in a manner which aims to elucidate the truth[81]”.

The above largely shows that there must be a great deficit in legal practitioners knowing and understanding the law which is supposed to govern them and their conduct. A read through the law, including the legally binding Rules, gives very clear instructions as to what they are and are not allowed to do – thus is it clear that many of them are either are not reading the law or are deliberately ignoring it. An example of this is where barristers even believe that for themselves to lie to the courts, or their clients to lie under oath, is a “small” or “trifling” matter – which it apparently is given that they are allowed to do it so prolifically. For example, when he and his clients were charged by me with having lied to the court, Anthony Southall QC made the following submissions to their Honours of the Court of Appeal in 2016:

Southall: One matter that arose out of that principle on finality in the Attwells case is, the purpose of finality is to put an end to the re-litigation of small matters, of minutiae hesitate to use the expression – de minimis non curat lex.

Santamaria JA: You didn’t seem to hesitate very long. Once you said “small matters”, I’m not sure what minutiae added to it because, as I understand it, that’s just the Latin for “small matters”. … What is your contention? Is it your contention that the principle of finality is to guard against the re-litigation of small matters? 

Southall: Yes. 

Kyrou JA: Why is it confined to small matters?

Santamaria JA: Why small matters?

Southall: Or any matters, but in this case small matters such as the issue of who attended a mediation on a particular date; such as the weather there were 23 or 40 days spent at VCAT; whether there was dust being created at any particular time. In the context of this case, they are what could be said to be small matters, or trifling matters even. If they can give vent to are renewal of issue by way of re-litigation, then the principle of finality of litigation really is put in serious generally insofar as it constitutes a very proper and basic principle of law. 

Santamaria JA: Mr Southall, you did use a Latin phrase, and I think [she] needs to know what that phrase means. 

Southall: De minimus non curat lex means, the law does not deal with little things. 


Kyrou JA: I think your point, that finality is important in relation to small matters applies even with greater force in big matters, because – – –

Southall:  It does, yes.

Kyrou JA: – – – a smaller matter might take half an hour to raise, but a big matter might take weeks. I don’t understand the distinction between small matters and big matters. 

Southall: And it would be costly. No, the point that I was making in this case, is that, it’s a situation where [she] had raised these issues, which we contend – we’re not saying that they were found to be small, we contend they’re small matters, or trifling matters, before His Honour Justice Pagone, and again raised it in her argument in front of His Honour Justice McDonald and His Honour – no, I won’t go on with that point. But they ought not to be seen as enabling a litigant to re-open issues of fact in a case on different occasions and on a repetitive basis. Even if the court thought that it should go through the exercise of looking at every alleged lie, or alleged untruth which was raised by the applicant here, we would contend that Mr Justice McDonald quite properly found that it was not appropriate in the interests of justice to grant relief[82].[83] 


It is no wonder that there seems to be a general feeling amongst many of the populace that legal practitioners are not to trusted and question if they should be taken seriously – look at the number of jokes about lawyers.

A number of the members of the judiciary have no issue with the law being ignored

It is a fact that most, if not all, of the members of the judiciary have been solicitors and barristers themselves. And, as such, apparently see nothing wrong (inter alia): (1) in the law being ignored, (2) with lies being told to the court and to others, (3) with documents and relevant material facts being withheld and concealed, and (4) with being deliberately misled and deceived.

One clear example is from a former judge of the Federal Court – in his own words, Ray Finkelstein said[84], remembering that withholding information or material facts is lying by omission and actively misleading and deceiving the court: “Speaking personally, as counsel, I had no difficulty in holding back information”. He then went on to say about other judges: “Judge Frankel spoke of the ‘palpable … novelty’[85] he felt as a new judge, as he made genuine attempts to seek the truth, having been accustomed to the partisan role of the attorney. He observed that ‘many judges, withdrawn from the fray, watch it with benign and detached affection, chuckling nostalgically now and then as the truth suffers injury or death in the process[86].[87].” He may think it funny or acceptable, but for those who rely on truth being fundamental to justice, it is beyond appalling, but explains a lot.

Additionally

Then there is the issue of “advocates’ immunity” – the granting of immunity for most, if not all of any unconscionable and/or illegal conduct of the legal practitioner that could cost a party a case. In other words, a party cannot sue their legal practitioners under most circumstances, no matter how unhappy the clients were with the forensic decisions made without the client’s input, or made even against the client’s instructions. Further, even though a legal person representing one side is not an “advocate” for the opposing party, opposing legal practitioners have now been granted the protections of “advocates’ immunity” by Daly AsJ who (1) refused to allow an action against two legal practitioners who were on the opposing side to me for what they had done[88], and (2) seemingly believed their claim that they should not be held responsible for what they did and (3) provided nothing in her reasons that would give any grounds to dispel the belief that she accepted the claims made by the opposing legal representatives that they were protected by the advocates’ immunity and could not be sued by me. It is my opinion that, as a result, legal practitioners will be now even more a law unto themselves, are shielded from the responsibility for their conduct by reason of the principle of advocates’ immunity, and are therefore virtually untouchable – and I believe they know it and will love it. What it did in my circumstances, was that Smith and Southall were given the advocates’ immunity and thereby did not even receive a reprimand for having actively, deliberately and (to my way of thinking) consistently, lying (in documents, in submissions, and in addresses) to the court and deliberately setting out to mislead and deceive.

The CPA gives grounds for taking action against those who lie in court, including legal practitioners who actively set out to lie and deceive, yet the court will not allow such an action to be taken in line with the Act. McDonald J certainly gave me the impression of being livid with me for having the gall to take action in line with the timings of the law for the gross dishonesties of man X, man Y and their legal team. McDonald J and accused me of “continuing to defame” man X and man Y by my charges against them (charges which I had given ample proof of in a number of sworn affidavits)[89].

The fact is: if you are honest, you will be truthful: “Honesty is a facet of moral character that connotes positive and virtuous attributes such as integrity, truthfulness, straightforwardness, including straightforwardness of conduct, along with the absence of lying, cheating, theft, etc. Honesty also involves being trustworthy, loyal, fair, and sincere[90].

It is my personal and strong opinion that: THERE. IS. NO. REAL. JUSTICE. WITHOUT. TRUTH.


[1]    There are frequent reports of the “fact finders’” results after many of Trump’s speeches.

[2]    www.quora.com › What-is-the-difference-between-truth-and-justice

[3]    www.beyondintractability.org › essay › Legal_Facts 

[4]    “An exploration of the meaning of truth in philosophy and law”, in the section “Abstract”

[5]    Bar News Winter 2011, page 100.

[6]    Ibid, page 101

[7]    Ibid, page 102

[8]    Truth and Legitimacy (in Courts), 2016, in the “1. ‘Truth’ in courts”

[9]    The Adversarial System And The Search For Truth, in “I Introduction”

[10]   Ibid, as footnote 1: “Jones v National Coal Board (1957) 2 QB 55, 63”

[11]   Ibid, in “II The adversarial model and truth”

[12]   The Cartel Lawyers and Their Nine Magic Tricks, in “US Supreme Court”

[13]   Ibid, in “Adversary System”

[14]   Truth and Legitimacy (in Courts) by Kenneth S Klein, Professor of Law at Californian Western School of Law, 2016, in the “introduction”

[15]   Santamaria J: T124:3-17  (11 October 2016)

[16]   Encarta® World English Dictionary © 1999 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. Developed for Microsoft by Bloomsbury Publishing Plc

[17]   T442:22-23 (16 April 2013)

[18]   T444:5-10 (16 April 2013)

[19]   T212:1-3 (12 April 2013)

[20]   His Honour’s Judgment on amended defence, May 2013, Reasons at [6]

[21]   T389:25:26 (16 April 2013)

[22]   T392:28-29 (16 April 2013)

[23]   T393:4-6 (16 April 2013)

[24]   T500:31–T501:2 (17 April 2013)

[25]   T104:23-31 (11 October 2016)

[26]   Kyrou J: T115:15-22 (11 October 2016)

[27]   Kyrou J: T124:3-17  (11 October 2016)

[28]   Foreword page vii

[29]   Executive summary, pages xxv & xxvi

[30]   Page xxix

[31]   R v Schroen [2001] VSCA 126, para 14


[32]   E.g. Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s. 35

[33]   Pages 9 &10

[34]   R v Traino (1987) 45 SASR 473


[35]   Ibid, p. 475. This definition is cited in Butterworths Concise Australian Legal Dictionary, above note 11, p. 333


[36]   Page 189

[37]   Page 189

[38]   See definition in R v Traino (1987) 45 SASR 473


[39]   Freckelton, Criminal Law Investigations and Procedure, above note 28, para 1.9.30. Section 141 of the Evidence Act 1958 (Vic) provides: “any person who upon or in any oath examination affidavit affirmation or declaration whatsoever which is required authorized or permitted in or by or under any provision of this Act wilfully and corruptly makes any false statement whether oral or in writing shall be deemed to be guilty of wilful and corrupt perjury. This section shall apply notwithstanding that such oath examination affidavit affirmation or declaration may be required authorized or permitted by or under any other Act whether passed before or after the commencement of this Act.”

[40]   Page 189

[41]   Crimes Act 1958, section 314(3).

[42]   Page 205

[43]   Benjamin Lindner, submission no. 8, p. 8


[44]   Page 220

[45]   Page 236

[46]   “s4 definitions – substantially true means true in substance or not materially different from the truth

[47]   But covertly retained

[48]   T209:25–T211:5 (12 April 2013)

[49]   T211:28–T212:9

[50]   T213:25, T214:2-11 (12 April 2013)

[51]   T44:21-29 (10 April 2013)

[52]   T60:12–T62:5 (10 April 2013)

[53]   T62:15-25 (10 April 2013)

[54]   T65:1115 (10 April 2013)

[55]   T166:11-17 (12 April 2013)

[56]   T185:20–T188:11 (12 April 2013)

[57]   T213:25–T215:17 (12 April 2013)

[58]   T38:10-12 (26 October 2015)

[59]   T12:17–T13:25 (11 October 2016)

[60]   Judgment of Pagone J dated 23 May 2013 Reasons at [28]

[61]   T97:25-29 (6 November 2014)

[62]   T484:8-9 (17 April 2013)

[63]   Man X and man Y’s quote from Carson (1993) 179 CLR 44, 60-61, 70.

[64]   Man X and man Y’s Notice of Appeal dated 2 October at paragraph 3(b), and man X and man Y’s Submissions dated 23 August 2013 (in relation to our respective application for leave to appeal), at paragraph 13(b)

[65]   Man X and man Y’s Submissions dated 23 August 2013 (in relation to our respective application for leave to appeal), at paragraph 5

[66]   Man X and man Y’s Notice of Appeal dated 2 October at paragraph 5(b) and their Submissions dated 23 August 2013, in relation to our respective applications for leave to appeal, at paragraph 16(b)

[67]   Man X and man Y’s Submissions dated 23 August 2013 and 14 April 2014 (in respect of their appeal application and my application for leave to appeal), at paragraph 5.

[68]   T12:1-2 (6 November 2014)

[69]   T28:1-2 (6 November 2014)

[70]   T495:21-25

[71]   The Cartel Lawyers and Their Nine Magic Tricks, in “US Supreme Court”

[72]   Ibid, in “Lord Eldon”: “John Scott, Lord Eldon (1751-1838) was a member of the cartel who straddled politics and the law: MP 1783-96, Solicitor-General 1788, Attorney-General 1793, Serjeant-at-Law 1799, Lord Chief Justice of Common Pleas 1799, Lord Chancellor 1801-1806 and 1807-27. … And in ex parte Lloyd (1822)”.

[73]   The Adversarial System And The Search For Truth by Ray Finkelstein quotes the following case as footnote 1: “Jones v National Coal Board (1957) 2 QB 55, 63”

[74]   Ibid, in “II The adversarial model and truth”

[75]   The Cartel Lawyers and Their Nine Magic Tricks by Evan Whitton, “Lord Eldon”: “John Scott, Lord Eldon (1751-1838) was a member of the cartel who straddled politics and the law: MP 1783-96, Solicitor-General 1788, Attorney-General 1793, Serjeant-at-Law 1799, Lord Chief Justice of Common Pleas 1799, Lord Chancellor 1801-1806 and 1807-27. … And in ex parte Lloyd (1822)”.

[76]   The Adversarial System And The Search For Truth by Ray Finkelstein, judge of the Federal Court of Australia, in “III Suggested reforms

[77]   Ibid, in “1 Legal Professional Privilege

[78]   Ibid, in “1V Conclusion

[79]   Ibid, in footnote 14 which reads: “Samuel Williston, Life and Law: An Autobiography (Little, Brown, 1st ed, 1940) 271”. 

[80]   Ibid, in footnote 14 which reads: “Jeremy Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence: Specially Applied to English Practice (Hunt and Clarke, 1827) vol 5, 311”. 

[81]   Ibid, in “B Changes in Lawyers’ Responsibilities to the Courts

[82]   T106:26–T108:26 (11 October 2016)

[83]   It must be noted that the 3 instances Southall referred to were where (1) one of his clients, man X, had repeatedly sworn to having knowledge of communications held in private and confidential meetings to which his client had absolutely no access. It must be further noted that Southall had changed the issue to being one of who attended a mediation when the claim against his client was that he had given false testimony by having claimed to know the details of those private conversations – and Southall’s client was entirely incorrect in his false testimony regardless (meaning Southall’s client deliberately and repeatedly swore falsely under oath in this matter, and that Southall thought it a trifling or little matter with which the court should not concern itself); (2) the issue of how many days in VCAT were of such importance to his clients that they collaborated in exceedingly enhancing the number of days in order to try to make the court see their claims from their biased and incorrect view, thereby swearing falsely to that information (which again, Southall considered a small or trifling matter); (3) the matter of dust related back to the very heart of the defamation case where I had complained in my website that prolific dust had frequently emitted from Southall’s clients’ quarry site (and had provided photographic proof of my allegations, again showing that Southall’s clients made false accusations in order to try to win many hundreds of thousands of dollars in damages and costs – which Southall won for them using such tactics as this one). It is unsurprising that Southall was determined to have the matter closed rather than having my claims investigated because it could be asserted that Southall had suborned the false testimony.

[84]   The Adversarial System And The Search For Truth by Ray Finkelstein, in “II The adversarial model and truth”

[85]   Ibid, in footnote 4: “Marvin E Frankel, ‘The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View’ (1975) 123(5) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
1033”

[86]   Ibid, as footnote 5: “Marvin E Frankel, ‘The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View’ (1975) 123(5) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1034”

[87]   Ibid, in “II The adversarial model and truth

[88]   Their prolific lies in documents, addresses, and submissions, their use of correspondence that was false, their suborning of false testimony, their intimidating, bullying and defamatory conduct against me (just to name a few of the many ways they conducted themselves).

[89]   While the transcripts and judgments give a small window into his attitude, it is a shame that the hearings were not videoed given his tone of voice and body language, which were very revealing in my opinion.

[90]   en.wikipedia.org › wiki › Honesty